Abstract. This paper presents a case study of the use of model checking for analyzing an industrial protocol, the ACCESS.bus TM protocol. Our analysis of this protocol was carried out using SPIN, an automated verication system which includes an implementation of model-checking algorithms. A model of the protocol was developed, and properties expressed by linear-time temporal-logic formulas were checked on this model. This analysis revealed subtle aws in the design of the protocol. Developers who worked on implementations of ACCESS.bus TM were unaware of these aws at a very late stage of their development process. We also present suggestions for solving the detected problems.
Introduction
State-space exploration techniques are increasingly being used for debugging and proving correct nite-state concurrent reactive systems (cf. Rud87, Liu89, HK90, Hol91, DDHY92, FGM + 92]). These techniques consist of exploring a global state graph, called the state space, representing the combined behavior of all concurrent components in the system. This is done by recursively exploring all successor states of all states encountered during the exploration, starting from a given initial state, by executing all enabled transitions in each state. Many different types of properties of a system can be checked by exploring its state space: deadlocks, dead code, unspeci ed receptions, bu er overruns, etc. Moreover, the range of properties that state-space exploration techniques can verify has been substantially broadened during the last decade thanks to the development of ? \Aspirant" (Research Assistant) for the National Fund for Scienti c Research (Belgium). The work of this author was done in part while visiting AT&T Bell Laboratories. ?? This work was carried out in part while this author was with the University of Li ege. model-checking methods for various temporal logics (e.g., CES86, LP85, QS81, VW86] ).
In this paper, we present an application of model checking for the analysis of the ACCESS.bus TM protocol. The ACCESS.bus TM protocol is a serial communication protocol aimed at providing a simple, uniform, and inexpensive way to connect peripheral devices (such as keyboards, mice, modems, monitors, and printers) to a host computer. It has been developed and standardized by an industrial consortium of computer and peripheral manufacturers, referred to as the ACCESS.bus TM Industry Group ACC94] . At the time of this writing, implementations of the ACCESS.bus TM protocol already exist, and are expected to be commercialized soon.
Our analysis of the correctness of the ACCESS.bus TM protocol was performed using the automated protocol veri cation system SPIN Hol91] . SPIN checks properties of communication protocols, modeled in the Promela language, by exploring their state space. Promela is a nondeterministic guarded-command language for modeling systems of concurrent processes that can interact via shared variables and message channels. Interaction via message channels can be either synchronous (i.e., by rendez-vous) or asynchronous (bu ered) with arbitrary (user-speci ed) bu er capacities, and arbitrary numbers of message parameters. Given a concurrent system modeled by a Promela program, SPIN can check for deadlocks, dead code, violations of user-speci ed assertions, and temporal properties expressed by linear-time temporal-logic formulas. When a violation of a property is detected, SPIN reports a scenario, i.e., a sequence of transitions, violating this property.
Our analysis of the ACCESS.bus TM protocol pointed out several ambiguities in the standardized document specifying the protocol. Moreover, it revealed subtle and potentially harmful aws in the design of the protocol itself. Developers who worked on implementations of ACCESS.bus TM were still unaware of these aws at a very late stage of their development process. This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present an overview of the ACCESS.bus TM protocol. Next, we describe our model for this protocol, and discuss our assumptions. In Section 4, we specify two basic properties that the protocol has to satisfy. Then, we turn to the veri cation of these properties. For both of these properties, SPIN reported scenarios violating the property. These scenarios are presented in Sections 5 and 6. By analyzing these scenarios, causes of errors have been identi ed, and suggestions for solving the detected problems are presented.
ACCESS.bus TM Protocol
The ACCESS.bus TM protocol is a serial communication protocol. Its purpose is to provide a simple, uniform and inexpensive way to connect peripheral devices to a host computer. The analysis presented in this paper is based on release 2.2 of the protocol speci cations ACC94].
An important feature of ACCESS.bus TM is that it supports dynamic reconguration, which means that devices can be connected to the bus while the system is operating, and can become operational without the system being rebooted. The overall structure of ACCESS.bus TM is illustrated in Figure 1 . The protocol is composed of a hardware layer based on the I 2 C protocol developed by Philips, and of two software layers referred to as \Base Protocol" and \Device Drivers". Device Drivers are controlled by user applications running on the host. The I 2 C protocol is a serial protocol that is used for interconnecting IC's inside electronic appliances such as TV's and VCR's. It uses a bus composed of two wires, serial data (SDA) and serial clock (SCL), which connects the host and the devices together. Each component (i.e., device or host) has an 8-bit I 2 C address which is not necessarily unique and may change over time. When a component is plugged in, its address becomes the default I 2 C address. Information is transmitted on the I 2 C bus by means of messages composed of an address part and a data part. Since the bus is synchronous, there is no propagation delay. Any I 2 C component may try to send a message at any time over the bus. Although a same message can be sent simultaneously by several components, an arbitration mechanism ensures that two di erent messages are never sent at the same time. This mechanism is deterministic: whenever two or more components attempt to simultaneously send di erent messages over the I 2 C layer, the con ict is resolved in favor of the same message. A transmitted message is received by a component if and only if the address of the component matches the address part of the message, and the component is not simultaneously transmitting the same message over the bus. A message can thus be lost if its recipient is simultaneously transmitting the same message, or if there is no recipient. Each time a message is sent over the I 2 C layer, its sender receives a Positive Acknowledgment from the I 2 C layer if the message is received by another component, and a Negative Acknowledgment otherwise.
The Base Protocol aims at ensuring that every device will always be recog-
Message Types Purpose
Reset() Force a device to its power-up state and to the default I 2 C address. This message is sent by the host on power-up to all the I 2 C addresses. A device also sends this message to its address right after being assigned a new address.
Attention() Inform the host that a device has nished its powerup/reset test and needs to be con gured.
Identi cationRequest() Ask a device for its identi cation string, which is a sequence of bytes describing the hardware composing the device. This message is issued by the host after reception of an Attention message from a device. nized by the host within a nite amount of time after being plugged in, that it will be assigned a unique I 2 C address, and that its Device Drivers will be able to send and receive device-dependent functional data (such as mouse moves). The Base Protocol de nes a set of message types that can be sent over the I 2 C layer. These message types are listed in Figure 2 . When a device is plugged in, it sends an Attention message to the host, which should reply with an Identi cationRequest message, which should itself be replied to with an Identi cationReply message from the device. Then, the host should send an AssignAddress message containing a new I 2 C address for the device. When processing this message, the device updates its address, and sends a Reset message to this address.
Design of the Model
Our analysis of ACCESS.bus TM focused on the power-up/reset and identi cation phases, that is, the part of the Base Protocol dealing with Reset, Attention, Identi cationRequest, Identi cationReply, AssignAddress and PresenceCheck messages. We made the following assumptions in order to resolve ambiguities in the speci cation document. 3 { At the Base Protocol layer, every message received from the I 2 C layer is stored in a bounded fo bu er while waiting to be processed. If the bu er is full, new incoming messages are lost. { The processing of a Reset message by a Base Protocol entity empties its associated fo bu er. Moreover, the following features of ACCESS.bus TM were not modeled:
{ the deterministic nature of the I 2 C arbitration mechanism, { the timing constraints de ned in the speci cation document, and { the possible corruption of messages sent over the I 2 C bus. Consequently, if a message is sent over the I 2 C layer at the same time by one or more components, it is always correctly received exactly once by every component with a matching address that does not belong to the set of the senders.
The overall structure of the model is shown in Figure 3 . Each component is modeled by two processes: a microcontroller and an Upper Base Protocol (UBP). The I 2 C bus is modeled by shared variables, since message broadcasting is not a basic communication primitive in Promela. A set of semaphores is used to control the access to the bus.
Each microcontroller continually listens to the bus, grabs messages destined to its corresponding UBP, and appends them to a bounded fo bu er, which is a basic Promela data type. Each UBP takes messages from its associated fo bu er, and processes them according to the protocol rules (cf. Figure 2 ). It can send messages directly (without queuing) over the I 2 C layer. Moreover, it can nondeterministically switch between two modes, plugged and unplugged, 3 These assumptions match those made by the developers we had contacts with. 
Properties
The speci cation document ACC94] does not contain a precise and complete description of the service provided by the Base Protocol to the Device Drivers. Two basic properties that have to be satis ed by the Base Protocol were extracted from the document. The second property of the Base Protocol we consider is the following.
Property 2. Whenever a device is plugged in, it will eventually become operational, provided that it remains plugged. This property can be formalized by the following linear-time temporal-logic formula: Given the nite state space A G of a system and a linear-time temporallogic formula f, checking that all in nite sequences of states de ned by transitions in A G satisfy f is known as the model-checking problem. Various techniques have been proposed for solving this problem LP85, VW86, CVWY90, GH93, GPVW95]. SPIN includes an implementation of the algorithms presented in GH93] and GPVW95], which are based on a depth-rst search in the state space of the system (see GH93] for details). When SPIN detects a sequence of states that violates the property to be checked, it stops its search, and exhibits this scenario (formed by all states and transitions currently stored in the depth-rst-search \stack") to the user.
Let us now turn to the results obtained by SPIN with the Promela model described in the previous section and the two properties de ned above.
5 Veri cation of Property 1
First Flaw
After a few seconds of computation, SPIN detected that the rst property was not satis ed. message through the I 2 C layer is represented by an horizontal arrow drawn from the time line of the sender to the time line of the receiver. (Indeed, there is no delay between the sending and the reception of a message.) The head and the tail of the arrow correspond to the exact moment when the message starts to be transmitted on the I 2 C bus. If a message is lost (i.e., is not received by any component), the corresponding arrow does not reach any time line. A message is lost when its recipient does not exist, when its recipient is sending the same message over the bus, or when the fo bu er of the recipient is full. Thick vertical lines represent the delay between the moment when the message is appended to the input bu er of its recipient and the moment when the message is actually processed by its recipient. In the scenario of Figure 4 , two devices with the same identi cation string are plugged in at the same time. If both devices send and receive simultaneously all the messages shown in Figure 4 , it is impossible for the host to distinguish them. Moreover, the self-addressed Reset message is not received by any device if they both send this message at the same time.
This problem is a direct consequence of the properties of I 2 C, and is not surprising. However, it is worth noticing that having two devices sending the same message at exactly the same time is not an unlikely event. Two devices that wait for sending a message will synchronize on the message frame currently being transmitted on the I 2 C bus, and will both start trying to transmit their message at the exact end of this frame.
Second Flaw
A more complex sequence of events violating Property 1 is given in Figure 5 . As in the previous scenario, two devices are plugged in and have the same identi cation string. The rst device nishes its internal initialization process, and sends an Attention to the host at time t 0 . At time t 1 , the host assigns the address a to this device by sending an AssignAddress message, which is stored in the input fo bu er of the device. Then the second device sends an Attention to the host, and enters its identi cation phase. When the host assigns the address b to the second device at time t 2 , the AssignAddress message is also received by the rst device, since its address is still the default address at that time, because the request to change its address to a is still waiting in its bu er and has not been processed yet. When the rst device nally processes its incoming messages, it changes its address to a at time t 3 , sends a self addressed Reset, and sets its address to b at time t 4 . The self addressed Reset messages are then sent simultaneously by both devices, and are thus lost, allowing the two devices to become operational with the same address b.
This scenario reveals another problem in the protocol: here, the erroneous situation results not only from losing two Reset messages, but also from delaying an AssignAddress in a fo bu er. address to two devices with di erent identi cation strings is given in Figure 6 . As in the previous scenario, the rst device starts its identi cation phase at time t 0 , and the processing of the AssignAddress message received from the host at time t 1 is delayed until time t 2 . In the meantime, the second device sends an Attention to the host, and proceeds with its identi cation phase. On reception of an Identi cationReply from the second device, the host issues a PresenceCheck aimed at checking if the rst device is still plugged. The rst device does not receive this PresenceCheck message, since it is still using the default bus address. Therefore, the host receives a Negative Acknowledgment from the I 2 C layer. It concludes that the rst device is not present anymore, and that address a is available. It then assigns address a to the second device at time t 3 . Again, if the self-addressed Reset messages are sent simultaneously by the two devices, they are lost, and both devices become operational with the same address a, thus violating the rst property.
Suggestions
The three scenarios presented in Figures 4 , 5, and 6 reveal the existence of three causes of errors for Property 1 in the Base Protocol:
{ a Reset message is lost, { two devices share the same identi cation number, and { the processing of an AssignAddress is delayed. For eliminating these causes of errors, we suggest the following modi cations to the Base Protocol.
In order to avoid losing Reset messages, these messages should not be appended to the input bu ers of their recipients, but should rather be processed immediately upon reception, for instance by issuing hardware interrupts to notify immediately the corresponding UBP of the arrival of such a message. In such a way, Reset messages will not be lost when the input bu ers of their recipients are full. Moreover, the loss of a Reset message due to the fact that it is simultaneously sent by two (or more) components can be avoided by adding a unique rmware number of the sender to each Reset message frame. If this radical solution is too expensive to be implemented, adding a random number (e.g., the value of an internal clock) to each Reset message frame will strongly reduce the probability of losing a Reset message because of simultaneous transmissions of it. This probability can be further reduced by waiting for a random amount of time before trying to send a Reset message.
Concerning the second cause, preventing identical identi cation strings can be done by using a unique rmware number in the identi cation string of each device.
Finally, the problems resulting from delaying an AssignAddress message can be avoided by the two following modi cations. First, AssignAddress messages should be processed immediately upon reception, for instance by using hardware interrupts as indicated above. Second, whenever a component receives an AssignAddress message requesting a modi cation of its current I 2 C address, its fo bu er should be emptied.
Once we have modi ed our Promela model by following the above suggestions, SPIN proved in about 30 minutes of computation on a SPARC20 workstation with 256 Megabytes of RAM that Property 1 was satis ed by all possible executions of the model. Note that the correctness proof of our model does not guarantee that the modi cations suggested above are su cient for avoiding the reported problems in practice.
It is worth noticing that the timing constraints de ned in the speci cation document do not prevent any of the three scenarios discussed in this section from occurring. Indeed, each of these scenarios can easily be annotated with timestamps satisfying these timing constraints.
6 Veri cation of Property 2 6.1 Fourth Flaw SPIN quickly found scenarios violating Property 2 as well. Indeed, two or more devices can hold the I 2 C bus for an unbounded amount of time, and thus prevent other components from sending messages. The timing constraints described in the protocol speci cation help to prevent such situations, but it is easy to show that these constraints are not su cient to completely solve the problem. Moreover, the deterministic nature of the I 2 C arbitration mechanism (which we did not model) does not help to solve this problem. Indeed, if two devices alternatively send ApplicationReport messages over the bus, it can be deduced from the arbitration rules that, if their addresses have high-priority values (i.e., 02 and 03), it is impossible for a third device with an address of lower priority (i.e., FE) to be granted the bus at any time. In this scenario, the third device will never be able to send an Attention message to the host to signal its presence in the system, and hence will never become operational.
The probability of occurrence of such scenarios can be reduced by modifying the structure of the message frames in order to give a higher priority to protocol messages, as opposed to application reports, with respect to the I 2 C arbitration mechanism. One could use for this purpose the least signi cant bit of the rst byte of the frame (0 for protocol message frames, 1 for application reports). The protocol speci cation also includes an optional Device Bandwidth Management system, which could help avoiding the problem.
Conclusions
We have presented the main stages and the results of an analysis of an industrial protocol, the ACCESS.bus TM protocol. The analysis of this protocol was performed using SPIN, an automated protocol veri cation system including state-space exploration and model-checking algorithms. Our analysis revealed subtle aws in the design of this protocol, which were not found by simulating or testing the existing prototype implementations. We have also presented suggestions for solving the detected problems. During this work, SPIN repeatedly proved to be a powerful and e cient veri cation tool. Model checking is an e ective and simple method for verifying that a concurrent reactive system satis es a temporal logic formula. It makes it possible to reason about programs without having the burden of carrying out correctness proofs by hand. Indeed, model checking is fully automatic: no intervention of the user is required. This is a crucial feature for a veri cation technique to be used in industry, since products are often (read always) developed under time pressure, and therefore veri cation steps that would be too time consuming are likely to be skipped.
Although model checking is fully automatic, applying model checking for the analysis of communication protocols is not yet a systematic activity. The ability of quickly modeling a system at the \right" level of abstraction requires training, experience, and some knowledge of how model-checkers work: oversimplifying the model of the system should be avoided in order to be able to detect potential problems in the actual system, while abstracting enough irrelevant details is needed in order to keep automatic veri cation computationally tractable. Moreover, ingenuity and tenacity are often necessary for expressing interesting properties (i.e., those that might reveal signi cant errors) and for ltering error traces when looking for plausible scenarios (i.e, those that may occur in a realistic environment). In summary, veri cation is and remains a discipline in itself, even with the help of powerful veri cation tools such as model-checkers. Therefore, we believe that the most promising and pragmatic way for introducing formal veri cation in existing development processes is by forming groups of \validation engineers" who are specially trained for this task.
Another analysis of the Base Protocol can be found in Hoo95]. It was carried out by using an assertional method with the help of the interactive proof checker included in the veri cation system PVS ORS92]. Hooman proved manually that the Base Protocol satis es Property 1 and 2 provided that all the devices have a di erent identi cation string, that messages between base-protocol components are not bu ered, and that whenever a component wants to transmit a message over the I 2 C layer, this message is transmitted within a bounded amount of time. If one of these (strong) assumptions is not satis ed, no information about the correctness of the protocol is provided. In contrast, our analysis was based on a more detailed model, i.e., on weaker assumptions, and produced counterexamples violating Property 1 and 2. This enabled us to precisely identify the causes of these errors, and to suggest implementable solutions for these problems. Finally, all counter-examples mentioned above and the proof of correctness of our modi ed model were produced automatically by SPIN.
